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Abstract 
 
The violent nature of some crimes and the high crime rate in 
South Africa reflect the fact that some offenders constitute a real 
threat to the security of communities. It is understandable, 
therefore, that the state seeks to protect its citizens through 
preventive measures. Although South Africa has certain legal 
provisions on its statutory books, it seems that the declaration of 
persons as dangerous criminals is under-utilised. South African 
legislation dealing with the declaration of dangerous criminals 
can be improved by borrowing some traits of the Canadian 
legislation. Such features include the restriction of courts' 
discretion and the provision of concrete and more detailed 
guidelines on the nature of the offences for which the provision 
can be applied. The courts could also take into account the type 
of criminal history of the offender which would merit the 
declaration of a dangerous criminal. It is also important that the 
extent of the violence in an offence should be thoroughly defined 
in court. Courts need to balance their wide discretion on the 
matter with the provisions in the Act in order to protect the 
community against dangerous criminals. 
Keywords 
Sentencing; dangerous criminal; indeterminate sentence; 
preventative detention; discretion; psychiatric enquiry; 
community safety; under-utilised.  
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1  Introduction  
More than two decades into South Africa's constitutional democracy the 
country is still besieged by high levels of crime.1 Many of these crimes are 
committed with devastating brutality by repeat offenders.2 Though the 
courts can impose heavy sentences in an attempt to deter these offenders 
and the correctional system is aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating them 
back into society as law abiding citizens, there are unfortunately some who 
will continue to pose a serious threat to the safety and well-being of others. 
Such dangerous offenders pose a clear threat to a society intent on 
achieving peace and safety. The State is therefore obliged to address and 
prevent the possible menace that such offenders pose. 
Prior to 1994 the death penalty was regarded as the ultimate punishment. 
Currently, however, life imprisonment (25 years imprisonment) is one of the 
most serious punishments that can be imposed by a court and is regarded 
as a substitute for the death penalty.3 What many probably do not realise is 
that since 1 November 1993 there has been a provision in our law which 
permits a court to declare someone a dangerous criminal and to impose an 
indeterminate sentence.4 The power of courts to make such a declaration 
and impose such a sentence is contained in section 286A and 286B of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This article considers whether these 
provisions can realistically be utilised as an effective crime prevention 
measure to deter the commission of heinous crimes in South Africa. An 
examination is undertaken to determine whether the phrase "dangerous 
criminal" is appropriately defined to furnish South African courts with 
                                            
*  Abraham Hamman. BA LLB LLM LLD (UWC). Senior Lecturer Department Criminal 
Justice and Procedure, Law Faculty (UWC), South Africa. E-mail: 
ajhamman@uwc.ac.za. 
**  Chesne Albertus. LLB LLM LLD (UWC). Senior Lecturer Department Criminal 
Justice and Procedure, Law Faculty (UWC), South Africa. E-mail: 
calbertus@mailbox.co.za. 
*** Windell Nortje. LLB (NWU) LLM LLD (UWC). Associate Lecturer Department 
Criminal Justice and Procedure, Law Faculty (UWC), South Africa. E-mail: 
wnortje@uwc.ac.za. 
1  South Africa has one of the world's highest pro rata murder rates. 20 306 murders 
were committed in 2018. See Crime Stats South Africa 2018 
http://www.crimestatssa.com/national.php. Also see Cohen "Risk Assessment" 255; 
Snyman Criminal Law 27. 
2  See NICRO 2014 http://press.nicro.org.za/images/PDF/Public-Education-Paper-
The-State-of-South-African-Prisons-2014.pdf 19-21; Snyman Criminal Law 28. 
3 See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). Also see S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 
SACR 681 (SCA) para 15. Also see Snyman Criminal Law 26-29; Terblanche Guide 
to Sentencing 256. 
4  See Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 275. 
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sufficient guidelines to make such declarations. The wide discretion of 
courts to declare an offender a dangerous criminal is also analysed. 
The discussion commences with an analysis of section 286A and 286B. 
This is to illustrate when these provisions may find application in practice. 
The possible reasons why these provisions appear not to be applied by the 
South African courts on a more frequent basis are explored. There seems 
to be a paucity of this type of order, despite the many cases in which the 
conduct of the offender is viewed to be extremely dangerous and the 
individual is regarded as someone who threatens and undermines the 
safety of society.5  
This article also refers to the Canadian provision which deals with 
dangerous criminals and has survived constitutional scrutiny. Like South 
Africa, Canada has introduced preventative measures to protect the public 
against dangerous criminals. Seemingly some jurisdictions, like Canada, 
even have a clear definition of who may be classified as a dangerous 
criminal. Their law-makers have also developed a number of safeguards to 
review such declarations of dangerousness to circumvent the notion that for 
such a criminal the prison door is proverbially locked and the key thrown 
away. It is conceded that the prevalence and severity of crime in the two 
countries are diametrically different. Nevertheless, South Africa can learn 
from Canada. The Constitution compels South African courts to consider 
the laws of other countries should we need guidance or when there are 
issues that our courts and legislature grapple with. The principal objective 
of the comparison is to ascertain whether the Canadian jurisdiction can offer 
possible solutions to South Africa. 
Below, however, some of the events which contributed to the passing of this 
law in South Africa are briefly discussed, as the historical context may assist 
in illuminating the purpose of the law and/or may reveal the reasons for its 
current limited application. 
2  How section 286A and 286B became law 
In 1989 William Frederich van der Merwe offered a lift to two female 
hitchhikers. At some juncture of their journey he stopped and brutally raped 
both, and murdered one of them.6 The surviving victim managed to escape 
                                            
5  There are few reported cases that deal with declarations of dangerous criminals and 
despite our requests for statistics from the Department of Correctional Services, we 
have not received meaningful responses that may alter our perception about the 
limited application of the provision in practice. 
6  See Cohen "Risk Assessment" 255. 
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after she shot and fatally wounded Van der Merwe with his own gun.7 The 
tragedy of what happened to the two women was exacerbated by the fact 
that Van der Merwe had previously been convicted and sentenced for 
sexual crimes against nine women.8 In respect of the aforementioned 
crimes, the death sentence had been imposed upon him in 1971. He 
successfully appealed and his sentence was replaced with a 20-year term 
of imprisonment, of which he served only 15 years.9 Van der Merwe was on 
parole at the time he attacked the two women.10 This case and a slew of 
other equally chillingly and gruesome cases led to a public outcry in the 
1980s.11 Understandably the public and the State saw a need for individuals 
like Van der Merwe to be removed from society. Presumably, though the 
death penalty was still a legal sentencing option, a case like that of Van der 
Merwe demonstrated that an alternative measure or sentencing option was 
necessary to protect the public against extremely dangerous individuals. 
In 1990 Justice Booysen and other experts led a commission titled: The 
Inquiry into the Continued Inclusion of Psychopathy as a Certifiable Mental 
Illness and the Dealing with Psychopathy and other Violent Offenders, 
widely known as the Booysen Commission.12 The Booysen Commission's 
terms of reference included the investigation and making of 
recommendations regarding the handling and release of dangerous and 
violent offenders, and sex offenders in general.13 As a result of the findings 
and recommendations of the Booysen Commission sections 286A and B 
were inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act by the Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act 116 of 1993 and came into operation on 1 November 1993. 
The criminalisation of individuals who pose a serious danger to society and 
the community as a whole is a global dilemma which requires specific 
legislation to combat their acts. The sentencing of such individuals becomes 
paramount in the light of the need to protect the community. This form of 
detention may be referred to as preventative detention. Preventative 
detention includes the physical prevention or incapacitation of the offender 
from committing offences in the community.14 The declaration of offenders 
as dangerous criminals is not unique to South Africa. In countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden, Canada and the United States of America similar 
                                            
7  Van Der Merwe died in hospital seven days after the incident. See Cohen "Risk 
Assessment" 255. 
8  See Cohen "Risk Assessment" 255. 
9  He served his sentence at the Zonderwater Prison Complex in Cullinan. See Cohen 
"Risk Assessment" 255. 
10  See Cohen "Risk Assessment" 255. 
11  See Cohen "Risk Assessment" 265. 
12  Generally see Gen N 49 of GG 14517 of 15 January 1993.  
13  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 5; also see Cohen "Risk 
Assessment" 265; Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24C. 
14  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 177. 
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legislative provisions are relied upon as a means of dealing with dangerous 
criminals.15 In Canada and the United States of America these preventative 
detention provisions have passed constitutional muster.16 In South Africa 
the provisions came under the scrutiny of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) in S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 (2) SACR 681 (SCA). Though the 
provisions were found to be constitutionally sound it is contended here that 
there are still some major questions which ought to be answered in regard 
to this law. Although Bull is regarded as the landmark decision in terms of 
dangerous criminals it is also important to look at the most recent judgments 
dealing with the particular sentence. But first, a thorough examination of 
section 286A and 286B of the Criminal Procedure Act is warranted. 
3 Analysing dangerousness for the purposes of section 
286A and 286B 
Section 286A of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the declaration of 
an individual as a dangerous criminal.17 This declaration is categorised as 
the imposition of an indeterminate sentence, as the duration of the sentence 
is not known at the time of the sentence.18 This section is specifically 
directed at offenders who suffer from psychopathy and anti-social 
disorders.19 Section 286A reads as follows: 
286A Declaration of certain persons as dangerous criminals 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4), a superior 
court or a regional court which convicts a person of one or more 
offences, may, if it is satisfied that the said person represents a danger 
to the physical or mental well-being of other persons and that the 
community should be protected against him, declare him a dangerous 
criminal. 
(2) 
(a) If it appears to a court referred to in subsection (1) or if it is 
alleged before such court that the accused is a dangerous 
criminal, the court may after conviction direct that the matter 
be enquired into and be reported on in accordance with the 
provisions of subsection (3). 
(b) Before the court commits an accused for an enquiry in terms 
of subsection (3), the court shall inform such accused of its 
intention and explain to him the provisions of this section and 
of section 286B as well as the gravity of those provisions. 
(3) 
(a) Where a court issues a direction under subsection (2)(a), the 
relevant enquiry shall be conducted and be reported on- 
                                            
15  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 6. 
16  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 6. 
17  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 275. 
18  See Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 252, 275. 
19  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24C. 
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(i) by the medical superintendent of a psychiatric 
hospital designated by the court, or by a psychiatrist 
appointed by such medical superintendent at the 
request of the court; and 
(ii) by a psychiatrist appointed by the accused if he so 
wishes. 
(b) 
(i) The court may for the purposes of such enquiry 
commit the accused to a psychiatric hospital or other 
place designated by the court, for such periods, not 
exceeding 30 days at a time, as the court may from 
time to time determine, and if an accused is in 
custody when he is so committed, he shall, while he 
is so committed, be deemed to be in the lawful 
custody of the person or the authority in whose 
custody he was at the time of such committal. 
(ii) When the period of committal is extended for the first 
time under subparagraph (i), such extension may be 
granted in the absence of the accused unless the 
accused or his legal representative requests 
otherwise. 
(c) The relevant report shall be in writing and shall be submitted 
in triplicate to the registrar or the clerk of the court, as the 
case may be, who shall make a copy thereof available to 
the prosecutor and the accused or his legal representative. 
(d) The report shall- 
(i) include a description of the nature of the enquiry; 
and 
(ii) include a finding as to the question whether the 
accused represents a danger to the physical or 
mental well-being of other persons. 
(e) If the persons conducting the enquiry are not unanimous in 
their finding under paragraph (d) (ii), such fact shall be 
mentioned in the report and each of such persons shall give 
his finding on the matter in question. 
A cursory reading of these provisions gives rise to a number of questions. 
An in-depth discussion of all the issues is beyond the scope of this article 
and might detract from a comprehensive analysis of some of the main 
controversies which this article seeks to grapple with. For convenience the 
practical question of when this law applies will be dealt with first. This 
question inevitably demands an understanding of “dangerousness” in the 
context of the provision. Put plainly, it must be when an accused is 
dangerous enough to be legally declared as such. Also, does the provision 
provide sound mechanisms to ensure the proper and fair application of the 
law? Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
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protection and benefit of the law. It is also important that the fair trial rights 
of every accused are protected.20  
3.1 When does section 286A apply? 
Section 286A(1) provides that a superior or a regional court which convicts 
a person can declare such a person a dangerous criminal if the court is 
satisfied that the person represents a danger to the physical or mental well-
being of other persons or the community.21 It is not immediately clear from 
the wording precisely when the provision is triggered. When can a court be 
satisfied that an offender is sufficiently dangerous for a declaration of this 
ilk to be applied? A perusal of the section reveals that the nature of the 
offence is an important issue that may be relevant to the question of when 
the section may be invoked. This matter will be discussed next. 
3.1.1 The nature of the offence  
It may be inferred from the wording of the provision that it is not necessary 
for the accused to have been found guilty of any particular offence to 
convince the court of his "dangerousness".22 Theoretically "any conviction 
would do", as was held in S v Bull; S v Chavulla.23 Logically this is an 
untenable position as it could lead to the arbitrary application of the 
provision. Furthermore it may be argued that the reference to a “danger to 
the physical or mental well-being of persons and that the community should 
be protected against him” would also make the provision applicable to a 
myriad of offences and most offenders, given the scale and nature of crime 
in South Africa. From section 286A(1) alone it appears that the provision 
may be applied, depending on how the court views the person, and his 
conviction at the time does not necessarily play a major role in this regard. 
No onus needs to be satisfied, but the court a quo needs to be convinced 
that the offender poses a threat to the physical and mental well-being of 
persons and that the community needs protection from the offender.24 
Terblanche notes that "within the context of section 286A it is clear that the 
greater the risk and the greater the evil, the more likely the court will be to 
find the offender dangerous."25 The court thus has a very broad discretion 
from the outset.  
                                            
20  See generally s 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21  See Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24C; Kemp et al 
Criminal Procedure Casebook 526; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 275; S v Bull; 
S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 7. 
22  See Kemp et al Criminal Procedure Casebook 526; Cohen "Risk Assessment" 266. 
23  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 7; Cohen "Risk Assessment" 
266. 
24  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
25  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 275. 
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The SCA in Bull held that a court must consider the following factors when 
determining whether or not an offender should be declared a dangerous 
criminal: the personal characteristics of the accused as revealed by the 
psychiatric report; the facts and circumstances of the case; the accused's 
history of violent behaviour; and the accused's previous convictions.26 In S 
v T the Supreme Court of Appeal listed the following considerations for the 
imposition of the declaration as a dangerous criminal: 
(1) the crime itself is not so serious as to warrant a sentence of life 
imprisonment, where (2) the convicted person represents a danger to the 
physical and mental well-being of other persons (3) sufficiently serious to 
warrant his detention for an indefinite period and where (4) there is a possibility 
that his condition may improve to such an extent that that would no longer be 
the case.27 
Based on these factors it may be reasonably expected that persons such 
as serial killers and career gang members who persistently threaten the 
well-being of communities would at least be subjected to scrutiny in terms 
of this provision. This, however, appears not to be the case, despite the 
SCA's guidance regarding the determination of dangerousness. It is curious 
in a country where the public often writhes with fear of crime that 
preventative detention, a legal mechanism, is not used with regularity.28 
Arguably this may be attributed to the generic nature of the criteria provided 
by the SCA. Though the factors collectively denote that the provision is 
relevant to repeat offenders who have displayed a history of violence and 
who had previously been convicted on charges of a violent nature, courts 
still have a very broad discretion in declaring offenders to be dangerous 
criminals.29 Questions such as the degree of violence and the seriousness 
and number of convictions still arise. Offenders are therefore not treated 
fairly, as some very dangerous criminals will escape the application of this 
provision, while others will feel the full impact thereof. Moreover, though the 
SCA has provided criteria to consider in determining an offender's 
“dangerousness”, it can still not be readily predicted in which cases the 
provision will apply and in which not. Of much greater concern, however, is 
the fact that society cannot enjoy the complete benefit of preventative 
detention as a crime prevention measure.  
                                            
26  The SCA added that when determining dangerousness a court must draw its own 
conclusions. See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 18. 
27  S v T 1997 1 SACR 496 (SCA) paras 499d-e. 
28  For a comprehensive discussion regarding preventative detention, generally see 
Elias 2009 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 99-234. Also see S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 
SACR 681 (SCA) para 6. 
29  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24C. 
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Next, though, it will be considered whether section 286A has inherent 
safeguards to ensure its proper application in cases where the courts do in 
fact decide to invoke it. 
3.2 Are there sound safeguards to ensure the proper application of 
the section? 
Section 286A(2)(a) provides that if it appears to the court or if it is alleged 
before the court that the accused is a dangerous criminal the court "may" 
after conviction direct that the matter be enquired into.30 The language of 
the subsection denotes that a court is not compelled to make such a 
direction even if it appears to the court that the offender is a danger or it is 
so alleged. This is problematic as it is not self-evident why a court would 
decide not to hold an enquiry where the offender appears to pose the type 
of danger against which the legislature seeks to protect the public. A court 
should at the least be required to provide reasons as to why such an enquiry 
will not be held. In the absence of such a requirement, it is possible for 
courts to ignore the provision even in cases where an offender poses a 
serious threat to individuals or communities. Arguably this discretion is 
overly broad and the potential for the unfair treatment of offenders is 
consequently enhanced. That being said, it is in the nature of our sentencing 
courts to apply a wide sentencing discretion in criminal cases.31 It is 
important, however, for judges to apply this discretion fairly, especially when 
legislation dealing with dangerous criminality is applied, taking into account 
the long-term impact that such a form of imprisonment may have on the 
accused. Nevertheless, the fact that a court is not compelled to direct an 
enquiry into the dangerousness of the offender amounts to a possible 
violation of the accused’s right to be treated equally before the law in terms 
of section 9(1) of the Constitution. It thus remains important to appoint 
experienced judges to hear cases where the offender has been alleged to 
have committed a serious crime.32  
Despite the courts' broad discretion with regard to whether or not the 
provision should be invoked in the first place, and whether or not to make a 
declaration, section 286A(3)(a) provides that before a court can declare 
someone a dangerous criminal, such an offender will first have to be sent 
                                            
30  See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 7. 
31  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 131. For an analysis of the wide discretion in our 
courts see S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 54; S v Dzukuda 2000 2 
SACR 443 (CC) para 35; S v Moloi 1987 1 SA 196 (A) paras 218H-I. 
32  See Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 129. 
A HAMMAN, C ALBERTUS & W NORTJE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  10 
to a psychiatric hospital to be assessed.33 The soundness of these 
procedural safeguards will be discussed below.  
3.2.1 The psychiatric enquiry as directed by the court 
Section 286A(2)(a) provides that if the court directs that an enquiry be 
conducted it should be conducted by a medical superintendent or a 
psychiatrist appointed by the court.34 This is in all probability in recognition 
that courts and parole boards are not able to predict the future 
dangerousness of offenders upon release without the assistance of 
psychiatrists that specialise in criminal law cases.35 On the face of it, this is 
a procedural safeguard that protects offenders from being declared 
dangerous exclusively at the discretion of the courts.36 The psychiatrist's 
report should include a description of the nature of the inquiry and a finding 
whether or not the accused presents a danger to society.37 If the 
psychiatrists are not unanimous in their findings about the potential 
dangerousness of the accused, then the parties who conducted the enquiry 
will be requested to present their findings in court.38 The court is not obliged 
to accept the view and make a declaration that is consistent with the 
psychiatrist's report. This is evident from section 286A(4)(a), (b) and (c), 
which provides that the court “may” determine the matter based inter alia on 
a unanimous report or where the reports are not unanimous or are disputed, 
after hearing more evidence. Moreover in S v Bull; S v Chavulla it was held 
that even if the court finds that the accused poses a danger to the physical 
or mental well-being of others and that the community should be protected 
against the accused, the court is not obliged to make the declaration of 
dangerous criminality.39 This affirms the broad discretion of the courts. It is 
as if the legislature intended this discretion to be wide.40 That being said, 
the wide discretion of the courts is also visible in the imposition of sentences 
such as determinate imprisonment and life imprisonment.41 No obligation 
arises for a court to impose the sentence of a declaration as a dangerous 
                                            
33  See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 8; Cohen "Risk 
Assessment" 266; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 276. 
34  Hereafter, the term medical superintendent and psychiatrist will be used 
interchangeably. His and her will also be used interchangeably. 
35  See generally, for example Stevens 2008 De Jure. 
36  See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 22.  
37  Section 286A(3)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Generally, also see 
Zabow and Cohen 1993 Medicine and Law 417-430. 
38  Section 286A(3)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also see Kemp et al 
Criminal Procedure Casebook 527. 
39  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 7. 
40  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
41  See S v Makoula 1978 4 SA 763 (SWA) 766G; R v Swarts 1953 4 SA 461 (A) 463B-
C. Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D; 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 277. 
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offender on any convicted offender.42 It is submitted that the wide discretion 
of the court should be carefully applied when imposing a sentence where 
an offender poses a serious threat to the community in terms of section 
286A. The physiatric reports fulfil an important ancillary role, as courts are 
not always in a position to determine "dangerousness" by themselves, as 
seen in the cases below. 
In S v Bull; S v Chavulla the psychiatrists in both cases were not of the 
opinion that the accused would still pose a danger to society after a period 
of 10 years imprisonment.43 Contrary to these reports the trial court judge 
imposed indeterminate sentences of 30 and 50 years respectively. These 
sentences were later criticised and replaced by the SCA. The SCA placed 
significant emphasis on the psychiatrists' reports as it replaced the 
indeterminate sentences with life imprisonment. This was appropriate in this 
specific case. The case may be viewed as a precedent for the position that 
an offender cannot be declared a dangerous criminal without psychiatric 
evidence to that effect.44 It also suggests that sufficient weight ought to be 
given to psychiatrists’ reports when making a determination as to the 
dangerousness of a person.45 Similarly, in S v Chimboza (unreported, WCC 
case no SS61/2014, 29 April 2015), the evidence of the physiatrist in 
relation to the question whether the offender posed a danger to the physical 
and mental well-being of other persons and the protection of the community 
was discussed.46 In this case, the offender was convicted of a brutal murder 
in which he ate the heart of the deceased.47 The psychiatrist expressed the 
opinion that: 
[the] accused's apparently almost blemish free past and ability to successfully 
run his own business, together with the fact that the offence of which he was 
convicted appears to have been committed in a unique set of circumstances 
of uncontrolled jealousy in the context of a particular passionate obsession, 
support the plausibility of the expert findings that he scored low on rating 
scales for risk assessment and psychopathy.48 
It was held by the Court that the accused could not be declared a dangerous 
criminal, and he was sentenced to a determinate imprisonment sentence of 
                                            
42  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
43  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 32. 
44  See Cohen "Risk Assessment" 266-267. 
45  Compare Petrunik 2002 IJOTCC 487, where it is stated that "[t]his finding of a high 
number of false positives following clinical predictions, which was repeated in similar 
studies in other states and other countries, effectively challenged the belief that 
mental health experts could validly and reliably assess which offenders were at 
greatest risk of reoffending." 
46  See Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
47  S v Chimboza (WCC) (unreported) case number SS61/2014 of 29 April 2015 para 
33. Also see Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
48  S v Chimboza (WCC) (unreported) case number SS61/2014 of 29 April 2015 para 
34. 
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18 years.49 Courts thus have substantial leeway in deciding whether or not 
to apply the provision and to declare offenders dangerous criminals. 
3.2.2 The accused's own psychiatrist 
It is positive that the courts are obliged to inform the accused of their 
intention to invoke section 286A and to explain the gravity of the provisions. 
Section 286A(3)(a)(ii) furthermore permits the accused to appoint a 
psychiatrist if he wishes to do so. Ideally these provisions could assist an 
accused in preparing for the proceedings and ensuring that his rights are 
not unjustifiably encroached upon. Moreover, this may reduce the risk of 
mistakenly declaring an offender a dangerous criminal, as the offender 
would have a second expert opinion as to whether he should be declared a 
dangerous criminal. Unfortunately, many accused are unable to afford the 
costs of appointing a psychiatrist. This provision could be perceived as 
being advantageous to those who have the means to appoint a private 
psychiatrist. Though the legislator's intention may not have been to 
distinguish between the affluent and the indigent as everyone is equal 
before the law, the effect of the provision cannot be overlooked. It impels 
the State to consider a more equitable measure for offenders to gain second 
opinions as to whether they ought to be declared dangerous criminals or 
not. Dangerous offenders who require such assessments are thus at risk of 
not being assessed within 30 days, a matter that may jeopardise the 
constitutionality of the dangerous offender provision. 
The Canadian position regarding experts differs from the South African. This 
will be discussed in greater detail later. 
3.3 Sentencing in terms of section 286B 
Once the court has declared an offender a dangerous criminal it must 
impose a sentence of indefinite imprisonment and determine a fixed term 
for reporting back to the court.50 This means that the person declared a 
dangerous criminal must appear before the court on the expiration of the 
fixed term.51 In effect, the judge may impose a very lengthy term of 
imprisonment. Arguably a judge who has reached a conclusion that the 
offender poses a serious threat to the physical and mental well-being of 
persons in society and that the accused is a repeat offender would be 
motivated to impose a long term of imprisonment. It is in essence his duty 
to impose the sentence so as to prevent future harm to the well-being of 
                                            
49  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24D. 
50  See Kemp et al Criminal Procedure Casebook 526; Cohen "Risk Assessment" 266; 
Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24F; Terblanche Guide 
to Sentencing 483. 
51  S v Bashford 2015 ZAGPPHC 146 (13 March 2015) para 2. 
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society. For example, in S v Bashford the trial court sentenced the offender 
and declared him a dangerous criminal in 1995, and the offender appeared 
again before the trial court only in 2015, when he was sentenced to three 
years correctional supervision.52 The court's decision was based on the 
report by the psychiatrist, who stated that the offender was not a threat to 
the physical and mental well-being of any person and that he was no longer 
a danger to the community.53 
However, the SCA's adjustment of the sentences in S v Bull; S v Chavulla,54 
namely replacing it with life imprisonment, has cast serious doubt on courts’ 
willingness to consider the application of the dangerous criminal legislation 
in serious criminal cases. The SCA took cognisance of the extreme brutality 
shown by the offenders in these cases, yet proceeded to overturn the trial 
courts' decisions. This does not afford clear guidance to future courts as to 
when section 286A should be applied.  
The SCA in Bull; S v Chavulla held that the courts are not obliged to apply 
section 286A even if it is found that the offender poses a danger to the 
physical and mental well-being of others, and the court has a discretion with 
regard to imposing the initial sentence, to save the provision from 
unconstitutionality.55 The broad discretion as to the application of the 
provision in the first place and the indeterminate period for reappearing 
before the court negate the elements of reasonable predictability and 
uniformity in the application of the law. Such a provision may add to the 
sense of injustice and inequality in a society like South Africa where a large 
proportion of the citizenry do not have faith in the justice system.56 All in all, 
the grave brutality with which the offenders committed these acts should 
surely have been one of the main requirements for the SCA to consider 
imposing dangerous offender sentences. This was not done as the 
inclination of the judges to rather impose life imprisonment outweighed the 
seriousness of the offences and the need to protect the community. The 
offenders in this case have served almost 25 years imprisonment. Only time 
will tell whether they have been rehabilitated and whether the sentences of 
life imprisonment have been justified.  
It must furthermore be noted that an offender sentenced in terms of section 
286B does have recourse to a re-evaluation of his sentence, in terms of 
                                            
52  See S v Bashford 2015 ZAGPPHC 146 (13 March 2015) paras 1-2. In this case, the 
accused and the co-accused violently attacked and murdered the deceased over an 
extended time. See para 8. 
53  S v Bashford 2015 ZAGPPHC 146 (13 March 2015) para 2. 
54  See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 38. 
55  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 16. Also see Du Toit et al 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 28-24C. 
56  See for example, Kemp et al Criminal Procedure Casebook 529. 
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appeal. This was clearly evident in Moetjie v S where the appellant 
successfully appealed the reconsideration of his sentence by the trial 
court.57 Also, in terms of section 286B(4) and (5) the court has the option to 
reconsider the indefinite sentence imposed previously. The court can (a) 
confirm the sentence of indefinite imprisonment; (b) convert the sentence 
into correctional supervision or (c) release the offender unconditionally. 
These procedural safeguards are essential to ensure that section 286A and 
B remains a legitimate sentencing option in the realm of South African 
criminal law.58 In terms of parole, the Correctional Supervision and Parole 
Board, having considered the report in the case of any sentenced offender 
having been declared a dangerous criminal, may make a recommendation 
to the court on the granting of parole or the placement under correctional 
supervision.59 Section 286B(4)(a) clearly indicates that "the court shall make 
no finding before it has considered a report of a parole board....". It is only 
when it comes to the reconsideration of the original sentence that the parole 
board comes into play, and then in a pre-emptive manner Terblanche notes 
that there is clearly no room for the granting of parole to an offender who 
has been declared a dangerous criminal, except for the intervention by the 
Parole Board as stipulated above.60 This position is understandable, given 
that the introduction of this law was motivated by cases like Van der Merwe. 
where the perpetrator was on parole when he re-offended. The State's 
intention to protect society is thus clear: by preventing a dangerous offender 
from being granted parole the state protects society against the offender for 
an extended period.  
4 Canadian position 
In this section of the article we consider the Canadian law applicable to 
dangerous criminals with a view to determining whether there are lessons 
and/or principles which may be borrowed for the purposes of addressing 
some or all of the flaws in the South African provision.61 In Bull; S v Chavulla, 
which currently serves as one of the main sources of authority on 
declarations of dangerousness, the SCA referred to the Canadian law which 
deals with dangerous criminals. As mentioned earlier, the South African 
Constitution permits the consideration of law in other jurisdictions when 
interpreting domestic law.62 In addition, it will become clear that the 
Canadian jurisprudence on declarations of dangerousness is much more 
                                            
57  See Moetjie v S 2009 1 SACR 95 (T). 
58  See S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 7. 
59  Section 75(1)(b) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 2008.  
60  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 483. 
61  For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the dangerous offender 
legislation in Canada, see Jackson 1997 FSR 256-261; Lafond 2005 Dalhousie J 
Legal Stud 3-7. 
62  See section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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developed and detailed than its South African counterpart.63 The Canadian 
provision may therefore be instructive and enhance South African law.  
4.1 The offence  
PART XXIV of the Canadian Criminal Code deals with the question of 
dangerous offenders. In section 752 of the Code, a very extensive list of 
offences (referred to as designated offences) is provided. Many of these 
offences have an element of violence and sexual violence. Section 752 
defines a "serious personal injury" as: 
a) Any offence, other than high treason, treason, first degree murder or 
second degree murder, that carries a maximum sentence of 10 years 
or more and that involved the use or attempted use of violence, conduct 
that endangered or was likely to endanger another's life or safety, or 
was likely to inflict severe psychological damage (a violent offence); or 
b) Sexual assault (s271), sexual assault with a weapon, with threats to a 
third party, or causing bodily harm (s272), aggravated sexual assault 
(s273), or attempts to commit any of these offences. 
At section 752.01 of the Code it is furthermore provided that if the prosecutor 
is of the opinion that an offence for which the offender is convicted is a:  
... serious personal injury offence that is a designated offence and that the 
offender was convicted previously at least twice of a designated offence and 
was sentenced to at least two years of imprisonment for each of those 
convictions, the prosecutor shall advise the court, as soon as feasible after 
the finding of guilt and in any event before sentence is imposed, whether the 
prosecutor intends to make an application under subsection 752.1(1). 
Based on the above it appears that the Canadian courts would be in a much 
better position than South African courts to determine the applicability of this 
type of provision. Only offenders who have been convicted of a serious 
personal injury offence, as described above, and are awaiting sentencing 
may be the subject of a dangerous criminal application.64 For example, in R 
v Blanchard, the court declared the accused a dangerous offender in terms 
of section 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and 753(d) of the Canadian Criminal Code.65 
The accused's criminal record included more than 10 violent offences, 
                                            
63  The dangerous offender legislation is a firmly established concept in Canadian law. 
In R v Lyons 1987 2.SCR 309 the Supreme Court of Appeal of Canada held that the 
1977 dangerous offender provisions, which have largely remained the same up until 
this day, were constitutional and did not violate the fundamental principles of 
Canadian law. Also see Jackson 1997 FSR 260; Stevens 2008 De Jure 345-346. 
64  Lafond 2005 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 4; Public Safety Canada 2009 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 7; 
Stevens 2008 De Jure 346. 
65  R v Blanchard 2018 ABQB 205 paras 3-4. 
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which included two sexual offences.66 It was also held by the Court that he 
had been convicted of 237 offences while incarcerated.67 
The extensive list of serious personal injury offences classified as 
designated offences together with the very specific requirements that an 
offender should have at least two prior convictions for such offences and 
have been sentenced to a minimum of two years for each offence compel 
the State to inform the court whether it will apply for an offender to be 
declared a dangerous criminal.68 Arguably these requirements limit the 
scope of application of the provision and diminish the possibility of violating 
the offender's right to equality before the law. Put otherwise, the offender's 
right to a fair trial is guaranteed while at the same time the protection of the 
community from a dangerous offender is considered. 
An offender under the Canadian Criminal Code is in a position to reflect on 
his past criminal behaviour (and record) and reasonably predict whether the 
provision may be invoked against him. The nature of the offence, the 
number of convictions and the previous sentences he has served will all be 
concrete indicators as to whether an application to be declared a dangerous 
criminal may even be considered.  
4.2 The assessment 
Section 752.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that when the 
State applies and the court believes on reasonable grounds that the 
offender might be found to be a dangerous offender, the court shall before 
sentencing order that the offender be kept in custody for not more than 60 
days to be assessed by experts.69 The South African provision similarly 
provides that an offender should be detained for psychiatric assessment. 
The period for assessment in terms of the South African law is a maximum 
of 30 days only, however.70 Furthermore the South African provision permits 
that this period for assessment may be extended in the absence of the 
offender unless the offender or his legal representative requests otherwise. 
The Canadian Criminal Code also permits an extension of the assessment 
                                            
66  R v Blanchard 2018 ABQB 205 para 124. 
67  R v Blanchard 2018 ABQB 205 para 127. 
68  See Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-
e.htm 4. Also see Petrunik 2002 IJOTCC 488. 
69  See Lafond 2005 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 5; Ulrich 2016 
https://www.uvic.ca/law/assets/docs/crimlawpapers/Ulrich,%20Lara%20-
%20Dangerous%20Offender%20Proceedings%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Gl
adue%20and%20Possible%20Charter%20Challenges.pdf 26; Valiquet 2008 
https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 3. 
70  Section 286A (3)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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period, but it is explicitly specified that such an extension shall be granted 
only if there are reasonable grounds to do so.71  
Apart from the minor differences in the period of assessments, there are 
differences in the reasons for the appointment of experts. Under the 
Canadian Criminal Code psychiatrists are appointed to conduct 
assessments for the court, although the parties may call on other experts to 
conduct assessments.72 Previously the 1977 dangerous offender legislation 
required that assessments be done by two psychiatrists.73 One psychiatrist 
would conduct an assessment for the defence, whilst the other would do so 
for the State.74 In South Africa the courts appoint the expert. It may thus be 
reasonably assumed that the expert is appointed to assist the court. The 
South African provision, as mentioned earlier in this article, also allows the 
defence to appoint an expert, but it does not explicitly state that the State 
may do so too. This could result in an imbalance of powers between the 
State and the defence with regard to the submission of psychiatric evidence. 
Though there is nothing in the legislation which prohibits the State from 
appointing such experts, an overt effort at levelling the playing fields 
between the State and the defence in this regard is necessary.  
4.3 Application for the declaration of a dangerous offender 
Apart from the above, there are other major differences between the 
Canadian and South African provisions regarding the application for the 
declaration of dangerousness. The Canadian Criminal Code offers more 
concrete criteria for a court to consider when making a declaration and 
provides more concrete guidance to sentencing in general than the South 
African provision. In Canada it seems that when the criteria are met, the 
court is obliged to declare an offender to be dangerous. This is evident from 
Section 753(1)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code, which provides that after 
a report of the assessment is filed the Court “shall” find the offender a 
dangerous offender if it is satisfied that the offender has been convicted of 
a serious personal injury offence as described in section 752, and that the 
offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-
                                            
71  For a detailed discussion of the assessment process of dangerous offenders in 
Canada, see Ulrich 2016 https://www.uvic.ca/law/assets/docs/crimlawpapers/ 
Ulrich,%20Lara%20-
%20Dangerous%20Offender%20Proceedings%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Gl
adue%20and%20Possible%20Charter%20Challenges.pdf 26-34. 
72  Public Safety Canada 2009 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-
pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 21. 
73  See for example, Ulrich 2016 https://www.uvic.ca/law/assets/docs/crimlawpapers 
/Ulrich,%20Lara%20-
%20Dangerous%20Offender%20Proceedings%20the%20Relevance%20of%20Gl
adue%20and%20Possible%20Charter%20Challenges.pdf 7. 
74  Public Safety Canada 2009 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-
pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 43. 
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being of other persons.75 Thus it is clear that the Canadian provision is 
triggered only when an offender is convicted of an offence as specified in 
terms of the Code. In addition, a Canadian court must declare an offender 
a dangerous criminal when all the requirements are met.76 Unlike the South 
African provision, there is no need to speculate as to whether the provision 
may be applicable to an offender.  
As in the South African provision, the Canadian provision requires that the 
court must be of the view that the offender poses a threat inter alia to the 
mental and/or physical well-being of others.77 Contrary to the South African 
provision, the Canadian Criminal Code offers guidance as to how a court 
may come to the conclusion that such a threat is posed by the offender. 
Section 753(1) stipulates that such a threat must be determined on the basis 
of evidence establishing:  
(a) 
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which 
the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms 
a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour 
and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, 
or inflicting severe psychological damage on other 
persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her 
behaviour,  
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the 
offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been 
convicted forms a part , showing a substantial degree of 
indifference on the part of the offender respecting the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of 
his or her behaviour, or 
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence 
for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a 
brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the 
offender's behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited 
by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or 
(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a 
serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the 
definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender, by his 
or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the 
commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, 
has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a 
likelihood of causing injury pain or other evil to other persons 
through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses. 
                                            
75  See Petrunik 2002 IJOTCC 497; Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/con 
tent/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 4; Stevens 2008 De Jure 346. 
76  See for example, Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/con 
tent/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 4. 
77  See Petrunik 2002 497; Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/con 
tent/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 3-4. 
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Though the above provision can hardly be regarded as an absolute panacea 
for the unfair application of the law, as the courts still have to interpret the 
provision and decide its applicability in every case, it may be argued that 
this provision offers greater guidance and predictability than the South 
African provision as to whether a declaration may be made or not. In brief, 
in Canada, offenders who have committed any of the designated offences 
as define in the provision and whose behaviour has been repetitive, 
aggressive, brutal and/or contrary to normal social standards and who 
appear to lack sufficient control over such behaviour ought to reasonably 
foresee that the provision will in all likelihood be applied to them. This 
assertion is supported by the following presumption in terms of section 
753(1)(1.1) of the Canadian Criminal Code: 
If the court is satisfied that the offence for which the offender is convicted is a 
primary designated offence for which it would be appropriate to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment of two years or more and that the offender was 
convicted previously at least twice of a primary designated offence and was 
sentenced to at least two years of imprisonment for each of those convictions, 
the conditions in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), as the case may be, are presumed 
to have been met unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities.78 
The clarity with which the presumption79 is expressed leaves little scope for 
conjecture in respect of some repeat offenders. Offenders are made aware 
that if they repeatedly commit certain offences and if they have been found 
guilty on more than one occasion they are at risk of being deemed 
dangerous criminals and that they would furthermore bear the onus to prove 
that their conduct does not fall within the scope of the provision.80 That being 
said, a reverse onus-style provision as illustrated above raises serious 
concerns about the constitutionality of such an onus. Such a reverse onus 
might not be in the best interests of the offender. The South African 
counterpart does not offer equal predictability, which in turn might place 
added pressure on the presiding officer to use a wide discretion. Apart from 
being permitted to appoint their own psychiatrist to perform an assessment, 
the South African provision does not afford offenders any real opportunity 
to prove that they are not deserving of a declaration of dangerousness. 
However, if the reports are challenged (by either the offender or the State) 
the court must hear evidence. Presumably such evidence would include 
testimony by the offender himself regarding the question of dangerousness. 
                                            
78  Section 753.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code 16 of 1985. 
79  This presumption came into force on 2 July 2008. See Public Safety Canada 2009 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 8. 
80  See Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-
e.htm 1. 
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4.4 Declaring a person to be a dangerous offender 
Section 753.1(4) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides as follows: 
If the court finds an offender to be a dangerous offender, it shall  
(a)  impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate 
period; 
(b)  impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been 
convicted — which must be a minimum punishment of imprisonment for 
a term of two years — and order that the offender be subject to long-
term supervision for a period that does not exceed 10 years; or 
(c)  impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been 
convicted. 
Unlike the South African provision, the Canadian Criminal Code places an 
obligation on the courts to impose one of the prescribed sentences above if 
the offender is found to be dangerous.81 The process of making the 
determination as to whether an offender should be declared dangerous or 
not will therefore not be futile. The Canadian provision can thus be relied 
upon to protect certain individuals or the public at large if an offender 
presents a threat to the safety and well-being of others.82 Both the South 
African and the Canadian law make provision for the dangerous criminal in 
order to specifically protect the community from dangerous offenders.83 In 
R v Steele the Supreme Court of Canada emphasised that "[t]he primary 
rationale for both indeterminate detention and long-term supervision under 
Part XXIV is public protection. Both sentences advance the ‘dominant 
purpose’ of preventive detention".84 
In terms of section 753(4.1) a sentence of indeterminate detention will be 
imposed upon a dangerous offender unless the court is satisfied that there 
is a "reasonable expectation" that the public can be protected against the 
offender by applying one of the sentence options in section 753.1(4)(b) or 
(c).85 An "indeterminate sentence" is therefore regarded as a measure of 
last resort reserved for the most dangerous criminals. In Canada the 
National Parole Board of Canada, and not the courts, decides whether an 
offender will be released and under what conditions the offender’s release 
                                            
81  See Stevens 2008 De Jure 347; Valiquet 2008 
https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 5-6. 
82  See Valiquet 2008 https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-
e.htm 5. 
83  See R v Johnson 2003 SCC 46 para 19; R v Steele 2014 SCC 61 para 29; R v 
Blanchard 2018 ABQB 205 para 8. 
84  R v Steele 2014 SCC 61 para 29; R v Blanchard 2018 ABQB 205 paras 8; 11. 
85  Public Safety Canada 2009 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-
pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 9; Stevens 2008 De Jure 347. 
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may occur.86 Debatably, parole boards may have insight into the prison 
context and the rehabilitation programmes available to prisoners. Such 
boards' work generally entails assessing the behaviour of prisoners and 
their readiness to reintegrate into society as law-abiding citizens. Further, 
an offender who serves an indeterminate sentence may apply for day parole 
four years from the date when he wase detained, and the National Parole 
Board is required to review his case if the offender has served seven years 
in custody.87 The National Parole Board must also do subsequent reviews 
at least every two years for the duration of an offender's detention.  
In South Africa the standard has always been that "[s]uch decisions are left 
in the hands of the judiciary, not of the executive. The judiciary is, therefore, 
ideally placed to control the sentence of such an offender."88 This position 
is clearly preferable in the light of the principle of the separation of powers. 
That being said, we continue to place a substantial burden on judges to 
determine whether offenders should be declared dangerous criminals. For 
the time being, it seems that it is a burden that will remain firmly with the 
judiciary. It is important that courts apply this sentence with firmness and an 
understanding of the requirements thereof in order to avoid any confusion 
related to its application. Many questions need to be addressed in the near 
future, as Terblanche rightly notes: "[i]ndeed, it is an open question whether 
a court that finds an offender dangerous in terms of section 286A retains its 
discretion to impose a different sentence."89 It is hoped that the Legislature 
will address the shortcomings in the Act. 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
In the context of the heinous nature of some crimes and the high crime rate 
in South Africa, it may be accepted that there are unfortunately some 
offenders who pose a real threat to the safety of communities. It is therefore 
reasonable for the State to intervene with measures such as preventative 
detention to protect the citizenry. Though South Africa does have such a 
measure on its statute books, it appears to be under-utilised. Surprisingly, 
it appears that the SCA is aware of the potential difficulties the courts may 
experience in applying these provisions. The SCA held that "[p]otential 
misapplication of a statutory provision is not the test for unconstitutionality 
in South Africa."90 Whilst this is true, it may also be contended that the 
                                            
86  Public Safety Canada 2009 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-
pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 9. 
87  Public Safety Canada 2009 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2009-
pcmg/2009-pcmg-eng.pdf 9. Also see Petrunik 2002 IJOTCC 497; Valiquet 2008 
https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/prb0613-e.htm 5. 
88  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 280. 
89  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 280. 
90  S v Bull; S v Chavulla 2001 2 SACR 681 (SCA) para 16. 
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provision does not only present challenges to the judiciary but also to 
accused persons, as well as to society. Every accused person has the right 
to be treated equally before the law. The unequal application of the provision 
means that some offenders, though they may be equally dangerous, will be 
treated more harshly than others. This may also mean that some 
communities may enjoy greater protection against offenders than other 
communities.  
Notwithstanding the challenges presented by the South African law which 
deals with the declaration of dangerous criminals, we contend that it can be 
improved by borrowing some of the traits of the Canadian provision. Such 
traits include legislation which provide for the following: the limiting of courts' 
discretion insofar as they may decide whether or not to direct that an enquiry 
be held where it reasonably appears that the offender is dangerous as 
defined by the provision; providing the courts with concrete and more 
detailed guidelines as to the nature of the offences for which the provision 
is invoked; and affording the courts guidance as to the kind of criminal 
history that would merit the declaration of dangerous criminality. The 
number and nature of the convictions should be specified by legislation; the 
extent of the violence which must be present in the case before the court 
must be described; and finally courts ought to be compelled to make the 
declaration if all the requirements are met, unless they can reasonably 
justify not doing so. 
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